Risk Aversion, Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change

The paper investigates a climate-economy model with an iso-elastic welfare function in which one parameter measures relative risk-aversion and a distinct parameter measures resistance to intertemporal substitution.We show both theoretically and numerically that climate policy responds differently to variations in the two parameters. In particular, we show that higher but lower leads to increase emissions control. We also argue that climate-economy models based on intertemporal expected utility maximization, i.e. models where = , may misinterpret the sensitivity of the climate policy to risk-aversion.     

Altruism and the Economic Values of Environmental and Social Policies

Altruism is a type of non-use value which can have different definitions depending on the type of goods entering the utility function of the altruists and their expectations about the contributions of others. The purpose of this paper is to measure the trade-offs between different types of altruist values originating from social and environmental policies. Environmental policies are concerned with reducing health effects from a power plant while social policies involve both the attainment of public facilities for education and leisure and an increase in the income of the affected population. The empirical application utilizes a choice experiment technique which allows for valuation of multiple goods. Health effects are decomposed into the values of the risk of becoming ill, the duration of the episodes and the limitations imposed by illness. Altruist values are elicited from a population that is not affected by pollution. Results show that altruism is significant for policies directed to reducing health effects and improving the income level of the affected population, whereas there is egoism for a policy aimed at improving public facilities in the polluted suburb. The value of altruism is significantly influenced by the expectations of net benefits to be received by the affected population.     

Central Bank's interventions and the Fisher hypothesis: a threshold cointegration investigation

The long-run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation is examined, allowing for structural breaks and asymmetric mean reversion. From a Threshold AutoRegressive (TAR) test applied to the residuals of the cointegration relationship (while allowing for both a break in the mean of the long-run equation and a smooth regime-transition), there is strong evidence for non-linear mean reversion properties for the real interest rates of the US Treasury Bill market. This suggests asymmetric changes to inflation shocks in the Central Bank's reaction function. The existence of different regimes is consistent with some interpretations of the monetary policies run by the Fed, such as credibility and opportunism.     

城市景观形象与旅游功能的整合——以芜湖市为例

对芜湖城市景观形象的现状特征进行了分析,并以城市中主要的景观如公园、广场、步行街、长江大桥等为例,探讨该市景观形象方面的利弊,分析了景观形象应如何与旅游功能相互整合,试图为芜湖及各城市的景观形象建设提供参考.     

自然保护地自然资源资产产权制度现状辨析

“建立以国家公园为主体的自然保护地体系”是党的十九大所提出的国家公园体制建设的新方向。实现自然保护地的有效保护管理是其重要内容，关键在于通过改革形成科学、合理的自然资源资产产权制度，而厘清自然资源资产产权制度的现状则是进行改革的前提。首先，对现行法律进行系统梳理，明确法律所认定的自然保护地中的自然资源类型。其次，从自然资源的产权种类及所有权改变、用益物权流转三方面总结了自然保护地自然资源资产的产权制度现状。再者，从各类自然保护地申报设立的条件和环保督查中反映出来的问题两方面入手分析了自然保护地的自然资源保护管理现状，从国家公园体制试点采取的措施出发分析了目前的改革探索，并提炼出自然保护地自然资源资产产权制度存在的四大问题，即自然资源资产产权的界定和要求较局限、自然资源所有权行使人虚位、公权与私权的利益协调机制不健全、改革探索中物权途径面临制度障碍。最后，从自然资源资产产权制度设计的角度提出了改革的4个方向。     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

Parallel Neutrality

This paper develops the notion of parallel-neutral technical change for inputs and outputs. It is shown that parallel-neutral technical change generalizes existing radial notions of neutral technical change. A taxonomy of the structural consequences of parallel-neutral technical change is developed.     

Price–Cost Margins and Structural Change: Sub-Contracting within the Salmon Marketing Chain

Some recent studies have benefited from advances in time series econometrics in order to evaluate price transmission mechanisms along the marketing chain. Due to the length of time series, structural changes may affect the evaluation of price–cost margins. In the case of the fresh salmon trade between Norway and France, the gross margin between producers and retailers has changed in level between January 1988 and December 1999. This article accurately identifies the date of a structural change using a range of recent ADF testing procedures (Gregory–Hansen tests, forward and backward recursive tests), before looking for the causes of the change through a survey. Two major factors can be identified: the product form and the marketing channel. Interestingly, both the increasing level of processing and the development of supermarket chains have resulted in a new role for the intermediaries, shifting from mere commercial intermediation to sub‐contracting for the big retailers.     

一种项目采购模式的博弈分析

本文试图用经济学理论 (主要是博弈与信息经济学的理论 )来分析目前工程项目建设中采用的一种工程设备、材料的采购模式。文章首先提出这种模式的内容与特征 ,然后就制度内各参与方 (主要为业主、承包商、供货商 )之间的博弈进行分析 ,分不完全信息博弈、完全信息博弈两种情况来分析这种采购制度下达到的均衡。     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91